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II. TORT LAW
A. The Tort of Invasion of Privacy Finally Recognized in Minnesota
On July 30, 1998, Minnesota joined the majority of otherjuris-
dictions by recognizing the tort of invasion of privacy.' In Lake v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,' the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized
that the right to privacy exists in the common law of Minnesota.
Specifically, the court recognized causes of action in tort for intru-
sion upon seclusion,4 appropriation,' and publication of private
facts.6 However, the Minnesota Supreme Court declined to findS 7
the tort of false light publicity a recognizable tort in Minnesota.
The tort of invasion of privacy developed from the common
law right to privacy which Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis first
1. See Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 232 (Minn. 1998).
Prior to this decision, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Wyoming were the only states
that did not recognize some form of invasion of privacy, either by common law or
statutory provision. See id. at 234.
2. 582 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. 1998).
3. See id. at 235.
4. See id. Intrusion upon seclusion is committed when one "intentionally
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his
private affairs or concerns... if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a rea-
sonable person." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
5. See Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 236. Appropriation occurs when one "appropri-
ates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
6. See Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 236. One is subject to invasion of privacy for pub-
lication of private facts when one "gives publicity to a matter concerning the pri-
vate life of another... if the matter publicized is of the kind that (a) would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the
public." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
7. See Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 235. False light publicity is committed when one:
gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other be-
fore the public in a false light if... (a) the false light in which the other
was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the
actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of
publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
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considered in a well-known 1890 Harvard Law Review article.8
Georgia, in 1905, was the first jurisdiction to recognize the com-
mon law right to privacy in Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance
Co.9 The Georgia Supreme Court accepted the views of Warren
and Brandeis and based its adoption of the right to privacy tort on
natural law and the well-established right to personal liberty.' ° Most
jurisdictions followed Georgia in recognizing the invasion of pri-
vacy tort using Pavesich and Warren and Brandeis' article as leading
authority." Other states provide statutory protection for the right
of privacy.
12
In Lake, Melissa Weber's sister took a photograph of Weber
and Elli Lake naked together in the shower while on vacation in
Mexico. 3 Following their vacation, Lake and Weber took five rolls
of film to a Wal-Mart store photo lab in Dilworth, Minnesota, for
developing. 4 When they picked up their pictures, there was a writ-
ten notice stating that one or more of the photographs were not
fully developed because the pictures contained nudity. 5 However,
the nude photograph of Lake and Weber was allegedly developed
and kept by a Wal-Mart employee or employees. 
6
Lake and Weber alleged that an acquaintance questioned their
sexual orientation and referred to the nude photograph five
months after the developing. 7 They also claimed that a friend in-
formed them that a Wal-Mart employee showed the photograph to
her. 8 One or more copies of the photograph were known to be
floating around the community.19 Lake and Weber brought an ac-
tion for invasion of privacy against Wal-Mart and one or more uni-
dentified Wal-Mart employees involved in developing and circulat-
8. See Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 234. See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D.
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890) (encouraging the recog-
nition of the common law right to privacy).
9. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). In Pavesich, the defendant made use of the plain-
tiff's name and picture in his life insurance advertising for his own benefit. See id.
at 68-69.
10. See id. at 69-70.
11. See Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 234.
12. See id. at 234-35.
13. See id. at 232.
14. See id. at 232-33.
15. See id. at 233.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
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ing the photograph.2 0 Lake and Weber claimed Wal-Mart invaded
their seclusion, appropriated their likeness, published their private
lives and placed them in a false light before the public.
Wal-Mart argued that Lake and Weber's claims should be dis-
missed because Minnesota does not recognize a common law tort
action for invasion of privacy.2 The district court granted Wal-
Mart's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, concluding that Minnesota does
not recognize the tort of invasion of privacy. The court of appeals
affirmed the finding of the district court, refusing to find a com-
24mon law cause of action for invasion of privacy. However, Judge
Schumacher stated that Lake and Weber had a "colorable claim for
invasion of privacy 25 and he questioned Minnesota's reasons for
not recognizing the tort.
6
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed
in part, justifying their decision by noting that "the court has the
power to recognize and abolish common law doctrines."27 Further,
the court stated:
As society changes over time, the common law must also
evolve.... The right to privacy is inherent in the English
protections of individual property and contract rights and
the "right to be alone" is recognized as part of the com-
mon law across this country. Thus, it is within the prov-
ince of the judiciary to establish privacy torts in this juris-
diction.2
With Lake, Minnesota joined the overwhelming majority of ju-
risdictions by recognizing the common law tort of invasion of pri-
vacy.2 The court stated, "The right to privacy is an integral part of
our humanity; one has a public persona, exposed and active, and a
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 566 N.W.2d 376, 378 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997).
25. Id.
26. See id.
27. Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 233 (Minn. 1998).
28. Id. at 234-35.
29. See id. at 235.
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private persona, guarded and preserved. The heart of our liberty is
choosing which parts of our lives shall become public and which
parts we shall hold close. " 30 The court further observed that "one's
naked body is a very private part of one's person and generally
known to others only by choice" and therefore, is a "privacy interest
worthy of protection. 3 Specifically, the court recognized the torts
of intrusion upon seclusion, appropriation, and publication of pri-
vate facts.32
The court declined to recognize the tort of false light publicity
because of their concern that "claims under false light are similar
to claims of defamation, and to the extent that the false light is
more expansive than defamation, tension between this tort and the
First Amendment is increased. 3 3 For this reason, the false light
publicity tort is widely criticized and is rejected by many juris-
idctions.34
Justice Tomljanovich dissented, noting that Minnesota has
never recognized a cause of action for invasion of privacy and the
court "should be more even more reluctant now to recognize a new
tort" because society has recently become "more litigious."35 The
legislature, in Justice TomIjanovich's opinion, should decideS 36
whether the tort of invasion of privacy should be recognized.
B. Non-negligent Seller Liability in Product Liability Suit
Prior to Marcon v. Kmart Corp.,37 Minnesota courts had not spe-
cifically held a seller, found to be without fault, strictly liable in a38
failure to warn case. The Minnesota Court of Appeals in Marcon
used a syllogism to logically reason that such liability should be im-
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See id.
33. Id.
34. See id. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Pulitzer Broad. Co., 709 S.W.2d 475, 480 (Mo.
1986) (refusing to recognize false light torts due to the resulting confusion and
potential ancillary questions raised); Renwick v. News & Observer Pub. Co., 312
S.E.2d 405, 413 (N.C. 1984) (noting that false light claims would reduce judicial
efficiency); Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577, 583 (Tex. 1994) (stating that it is
questionable whether remedies for non-defamatory actions should even exist).
35. Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 236 (Tomljanovich,J., dissenting).
36. See id.
37. 573 N.W.2d 728 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, (Minn. Apr. 14,
1998).
38. See id. at 730.
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posed on the seller."' Minnesota courts find manufacturers strictlZ
liable for injuries caused by a design defect or a failure to warn.
Strict liability has been extended to sellers who sell defective prod-
ucts that harm the product's user, even if the seller was not negli-
gent.4' Thus, liability should be extended to sellers who sell defec-
tive products because they fail to warn, even if the seller was not
found negligent.
42
Luke Macron was sledding down a hill, on his knees, on a
SnowMotion 760 plastic sled.43 As Luke approached the bottom of
the hill, the sled suddenly came to a stop after striking a bump and
Luke was thrown from the sled.44 As a result, Luke fractured his
neck, leaving him a quadriplegic. 5 John Macron, as parent and
guardian of Luke, commenced a product liability suit for strict li-
ability failure to warn and negligent failure to warn against Paris
Manufacturing Corporation, the manufacturer of the 760 plastic
sled, and Kmart Corporation, the seller of the 760 plastic sled.
46
At the district court level, the court allowed Marcon to include
an independent claim against Kmart for failure to test.47 At trial,
Luke Marcon's mother testified that no instructions or warnings
were on the sled. 48 The jury determined in a special verdict that
"the sled was not defective because of its design, but was defective
because it failed to provide adequate warnings or instructions for
safe use."49 The jury concluded "that the failure to warn caused
Luke's injuries."5  The jury also found that Paris Manufacturing
was 100 percent liable for Luke's injuries and awarded
$7,993,473.63 in compensatory damages.5' The trial court accepted
the jury verdict and separately determined that Kmart and Paris
52Manufacturing were jointly and severally liable. The trial court
39. See id.
40. See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 333-34, 154 N.W.2d
488, 497 (1967).
41. See Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 88, 179 N.W.2d 64, 68
(1970).
42. See Marcon, 573 N.W.2d at 730.
43. See id. at 729-30.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 730.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
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denied Kmart's motions for 4udgment notwithstanding the verdict
or:, alternatively, a new trial. 3 The trial court ordered judgment
against Kmart and Paris Manufacturing in the amount of
$8,314,893.96.- An insolvent Paris Manufacturing declared bank-
ruptcy prior to the case.55
On appeal, the court first addressed the issue of whether
Kmart could be held strictly liable when the jury found Kmart not
56negligent. Kmart argued that it should not be held jointly and
severally liable with Paris Manufacturing for damages because Mar-. 57
con failed to prove that Kmart was negligent. Generally, a non-
manufacturer defendant in a strict liability suit is relieved of its
strict liability for injuries caused by a defective product over which
it had no control. However, the nonmanufacturer cannot be re-
lieved of strict liability if the manufacturer of that defective product
is unable to satisfy the judgment award. 59 Thus, the court found
that because Paris Manufacturing declared bankruptcy before the
present action was commenced, Kmart could not be relieved of its
strict liability for injuries resulting from the sale of a defective
sled.6°
The Marcon court used a three-part test to prove strict liabil-S 61
ity. In order to recover under strict liability, the plaintiff must es-
tablish: "(1) that the defendant's product was in a defective condi-
tion unreasonably dangerous for its intended use, (2) that the
defect existed when the product left the defendant's control, and
(3) that the defect was the proximate cause of the injury sus-
tained.
6 2
All of the elements for proving strict liability existed in Mar-63
con. First, the court noted that the jury determined that the sled
was "in a defective condition, unreasonably dangerous to the user
because the product failed to provide adequate warnings or in-
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 730 n.1.
56. See id. at 730.
57. See id.
58. See MINN. STAT. § 544.41 (1998).
59. See id. § 544.41, subd. 2(d).
60. See Marcon, 573 N.W.2d at 731.
61. See id.
62. Bilotta v. Kelly Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 623 n.3 (Minn. 1984). The Bilotta
court derived the three part test from Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290
Minn. 321, 329, 188 N.W.2d 426, 432 (1971).
63. See Marcon, 573 N.W.2d at 731.
1040 [Vol. 25
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structions for safe use."64 Second, the jury determined that Kmart
sold the 760 plastic sled involved in this case to Luke Marcon's par-
ents. Finally, the jury determined that the defective condition of
66the sled was proximate cause of Luke Marcon's injuries.
Kmart argued that it was inconsistent to hold Kmart strictly li-
able when the jury found Kmart not negligent.67  In addition,
Kmart argued that it could not be held strictly liable for failure to
warn since the jury found Kmart not negligent for failure to warn.
However, the court determined that Kmart wrongly interpreted the
jury's finding that Kmart was not negligent to mean that it was not
negligent for any failure to warn. °  The court concluded that
Kmart was only found not negligent in its failure to test; thus, the
jury's finding that the product was defective because of a failure to
warn was not inconsistent with holding Kmart strictly liable. 70
The second issue the court addressed was whether Kmart
could be held liable for more than four times the percentage of
fault allocated to it by the)ury pursuant to Minnesota Statutes sec-
tion 604.02, subdivision 1. Kmart argued that the statute bars the
compensatory award because the jury found Kmart zero percent at
fault; thus, Kmart claimed it should be liable for zero percent of
the compensatory award.72  However, the court determined that
Minnesota Statutes section 604.02, subdivision 373 applied to this
case because it arises from the manufacture and sale of a product,
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 731-32. Also, the court determined that a finding that "Kmart
was not negligent does not necessarily mean the jury concluded that Krnart was
not negligent for its failure to warn" because Marcon brought multiple claims
against Kmart. Id. Those claims included strict liability, negligent failure to warn,
and a negligent failure to test. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id. Minnesota Statutes section 604.02, subdivision 1, provides in rele-
vant part, "[A] person whose fault is 15 percent or less is liable for a percentage of
the whole award no greater than four times the percentage of fault...." MINN.
STAT. § 604.02, subd. 1 (1998).
72. See Marcon, 573 N.W.2d at 732.
73. Minnesota Statutes section 604.02, subdivision 3 provides in relevant part
that "[i]n the case of a claim arising from the manufacture, sale, use or consump-
tion of a product, an amount uncollectable from any person in the chain of manu-
facture and distribution shall be reallocated among all other persons in the chain
of manufacture and distribution .... " MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subd. 3 (1998).
1999] 1041
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and there is an uncollectable amount from the manufacturer.74
Thus, the court concluded that the uncollectable amount from
Paris Manufacturing should be reallocated to Kmart because Kmart
was the only other party in the chain of manufacture and distribu-
tion.75 Therefore, in product liability cases, subdivision 1 does not
apply when subdivision 3 is applicable.76
Finally, the court addressed Kmart's last argument: that the
trial court erred in presenting the failure-to-warn issue to the jury
because there was no duty to warn.77 Generally, when a manufac-
turer or seller knows, or should know, that a product might be used
in a manner that will increase the risk not normally comprehended
78by the user, there is a duty to warn.
The court determined that the record demonstrated that
"Paris Manufacturing knew that children were using the sled in a
kneeling position, that it should have known that this use could
have increased the risk of injury, and that the risk was not compre-
hended by the user."79 For these reasons, the court of appeals de-
termined that the trial court was correct in submitting the issue to
the jury.s° Additionally, the court of appeals held that the trial
court was correct in finding Kmart and Paris Manufacturing jointly
and severally liable for the compensatory award."'
C. "Other Persons" in the Civil Damage Act
In Lefto v. Hoggsbreath Enterprises, Inc.,"2 the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that "other person" in the Civil Damage Act refers to
74. See Marcon, 573 N.W.2d at 732.
75. See id.
76. See Michael K. Steenson, Joint and Several Liability: Minnesota Style, 15 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 969, 979 (1989) (stating that Minnesota Statutes section 604.02,
subdivision 1 does not apply to product liability cases that fall under section
604.02, subdivision 3).
77. See Marcon, 573 N.W.2d at 732.
78. See Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 621.
79. Marcon, 573 N.W.2d at 733.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. 581 N.W.2d 855 (Minn. 1998).
83. See MINN. STAT. § 340A.801, subd. 1 (1998). The Civil Damage Act pro-
vides in relevant part:
A spouse, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person injured in
person, property, or means of support, or who incurs other pecuniary
loss by an intoxicated person or by the intoxication of another person,
has a right of action in the person's own name for all damages sustained
1042 [Vol. 25
8
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss3/7
TORT LAW
any person injured by the intoxication of another and who played• • • 84
no role in causing the intoxication. Specifically, the court found
that the fiance of an automobile accident victim and the fiancee's
daughter were "other persons" within the meaning of the statute. 5
Thus, these "other persons" were permitted to bring a cause of ac-
tion under the Civil Damages Act against the vendor who illegallyS 86
sold the alcoholic beverages to the driver.
On August 28, 1993, Michael Lefto was riding in a car involved
in a serious accident, which left him with severe injuries, including
817a closed head injury. Hoggsbreath contributed to the accident
and Michael Lefto's injuries by illegally selling liquor to the driver
88and Michael Lefto. On the same day of the accident, Desiree
Lefto and Michael Lefto were engaged to be married.8 9 Desiree
and Michael Lefto, along with Desiree Lefto's daughter, Nicole,
had lived together for five years prior to the accident.90 They had
been combining incomes and sharing a joint checking account for
the preceding two years.9 In addition, they shared household costs
and expenses, and jointly owned furniture and recreational prop-
92
erty.
After the accident, the Leftos were forced to sell their jointly
owned home and Michael Lefto's truck because of the loss of Mi-
chael Lefto's income. 9' Desiree and Nicole's standard of living was
reduced as a result of the accident.94 Particularly, the court stated
that Desiree and Nicole Lefto "have incurred expenses on the be-
half of Michael Lefto; have received less support from Michael
Lefto; and have not received the aid, comfort, and protection that
against a person who caused the intoxication of that person by illegally
selling alcoholic beverages. All damages recovered by a minor under this
section must be paid either to the minor or to the minor's parent, guard-
ian, or next friend as the court directs.
Id.
84. See Lefto, 581 N.W.2d at 857.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 856.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
1999l 1043
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they would have received but for the accident." 9'
Desiree Lefto sued Hoggsbreath Enterprises, Inc. under the
Civil Damage Act to recover for injuries resulting from
Hoggsbreath's illegal sale of alcohol to the driver of the car. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Desiree and
Nicole Lefto, concluding that they were within the class of people
who were entitled to a cause of action under the Civil Damage
Act.97 The court acknowledged the importance of determining
whether Desiree and Nicole Lefto were within the class of people
entitled to a cause of action under the Civil Damage Act. The
court of appeals affirmed the 
district court's finding.
Hoggsbreath argued that the "other person" Civil Damage Act
language is ambiguous and the court should interpret it according
to statutory construction and ejusdem generis. l ° Hoggsbreath con-
tended that the phrase "other person" in the Civil Damage Act in-
cluded only people with a legal relationship with the intoxicated
person because the preceding people mentioned in the Act-
spouse, child, parent, guardian, and employer-all have a legal
relationship with the intoxicated person. Hoggsbreath thus
argued that Desiree and Nicole Lefto did not have a cause of action
under the Act because they were not considered to be in a legal
relationship with Michael Lefto at the time of the accident.
102
In prior cases interpreting the phrase "other person" in the
Civil Damage Act, °3 the Minnesota Supreme Court did not apply
95. Id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id. Ejusdem generis provides that "[g] eneral words are construed to be
restricted in their meaning by preceding particular words." MINN. STAT. § 645.08,
subd. 3 (1998).
101. See Lefto, 581 N.W.2d at 856.
102. See id. Further, Hoggsbreath argued that allowing Desiree and Nicole to
bring suit under the Act would be against public policy because Michael Lefto and
Desiree Lefto technically had no legal relationship and Minnesota does not rec-
ognize common law marriages. See id. at 856-57.
103. See Hannah v. Jenson, 298 N.W.2d 52, 54 (Minn. 1980) (holding that an
on-duty police officer does not qualify as "other person"); Turk v. Long Branch
Saloon, Inc., 280 Minn. 438, 159 N.W.2d 903, 905-06 (1968) (finding that an in-
jured party who purchased alcohol for the torffeasor minor is not "other person"
under the Act); Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Williams, 265 Minn. 333, 337,
121 N.W.2d 580, 583 (1963) (holding that an insurance company does not qualify
as "other person"); Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81, 83-84, 103
N.W.2d 131, 133 (1960) (holding that a voluntarily intoxicated minor is not the
1044 [Vol. 25
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jusdem generis.104 The court concluded that "the term 'other per-
son' refers to any other person injured by the intoxication of an-
other and who played no role in causing the intoxication."0 5 Thus,
Desiree and Nicole were entitled to bring a civil action under the
Civil Damage Act.
10 6
The dissent, written by Justice Stringer and joined by Justice
Tomljanovich, listed a parade of horribles invited by the majority's
decision. 107 First, the dissent stressed that the statute says "other
person" injured, not "any other person" injured. 108 Justice Stringer
emphasized that because the majority held that the statute says "any
other person," by adding the word "any," the majority "dramatically
expands the scope of those intended by the legislature to have a
claim for injury under the statute" and it provides "no limits to who
can recover under the statute so long as damages can be proven. " '09
Second, if the legislature intended the statute to apply to every per-
son it would have included "any other person" in the statute.
Finally, Justice Stringer argued that "rules of statutory con-
struction require a narrow, cautious approach""' when the law is so
penal in nature as the Civil Damage Act.112 Justice Stringer stressed
that the rule of statutory construction, jusdem generis, should have
been applied.1n Further, the dissent argued that Desiree and Ni-
cole Lefto are not entitled to bring suit under the Civil Damage Act
because they had no relationship of dependency or legal relation-
ship with the party injured at 
the time of the accident. p
D. Manufacturer Has No Duty to Protect Child from Unforeseen Accident
In Whiteford v. Yamaha Motor Corp.,n 5 the Minnesota Supreme
Court addressed the issue of foreseeable danger in a product liabil-
"other person"); see also Lefto, 581 N.W.2d at 857 n.3.
104. See Lefto, 581 N.W.2d at 857.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 858.
107. See id. at 859 (Stringer, J., dissenting, joined by Tomljanovich, J.).
108. See id. at 858-59; see also MINN. STAT. § 340A.801, subd. 1 (1998).
109. Lefto, 581 N.W.2d at 858-59 (Stringer, J., dissenting, joined by Tomljano-
vichJ.).
110. See id. at 859. The dissent lists Utah, New York, and Alabama as states that
have codified "any other person" into their Dram Shop statutes. See id. at 859 n.2.
111. Id. at 859.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 858.
114. Seeid. at859.
115. 582 N.W.2d 916 (Minn. 1998).
10451999]
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ity case.16 The court held that a snowmobile manufacturer could
not have reasonably foreseen that a child would slide headfirst into
a stationary snowmobile while tobogganing and suffer severe inju-
ries when the child's face collided with a metal bracket on the un-
derside of the snowmobile.' 17 Because the danger was not reasona-
bly foreseeable, the court held that the manufacturer had no duty
to protect against such injuries."'
Generally, in Minnesota, a manufacturer has a duty to protect
users of its products from reasonably foreseeable dangers. That
is, no duty exists unless the danger is foreseeable.' When the issue
of foreseeability is clear, it should be decided by the court as a mat-
ter of law. The jury should determine close questions on foresee-
ability.
122
In Whiteford, Trent Whiteford and his mother, Rhonda White-
ford, brought a products liability action against Yamaha Motor
Corporation claiming negligent design and manufacture of the
Snoscoot snowmobile, negligent failure to warn of a dangerous
condition, strict liability for defective design and failure to warn,
and breach of warranty. 23 On January 11, 1992, Trent Whiteford,
age five, collided headfirst with a stationary Yamaha Snoscoot
snowmobile, which his older brother was operating, when tobog-
ganing down a hill. 12  His face hit the leading edge of a metal
bracket between the skis on the underside of the snowmobile.
25
Trent Whiteford suffered serious facial lacerations requiring sur-
gery and leaving permanent disfigurement.
126
116. See id. at 918.
117. Seeid.at919.
118. See id.
119. See Lovejoy v. Minneapolis-Moline Power Implement Co., 248 Minn. 319,
325, 79 N.W.2d 688, 693 (1956) (holding that questions for the jury existed as to
whether a manufacturer should have reasonably anticipated that a tractor would
operate at a speed faster than what is safe in low gear, and whether the manufac-
turer gave adequate warning of the potential dangers to the tractor users); see also
Hauenstein v. Loctite Corp., 347 N.W.2d 272, 275 (Minn. 1984) (holding that in
strict liability cases a manufacturer has a duty to warn all reasonably foreseeable
users of its products).
120. See Lundgren v. Fultz, 354 N.W.2d 25, 28 (Minn. 1984) (holding that
"[e]ven if the ability to control another exists, there is no duty to control that per-
son unless the harm is foreseeable").
121. See Larson v. Larson, 373 N.W.2d 287, 289 (Minn. 1985).
122. See Lundgren, 354 N.W.2d at 28.
123. See Whiteford, 582 N.W.2d at 917.
124. See id. at 916.
125. See id. at 917.
126. See id.
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At the district court level, Yamaha moved for summary judg-
ment on all of the Whitefords' claims. In response, the White-
fords provided an affidavit by a human factors expert claiming that
the bracket on the underside of the snowmobile made the snow-
mobile unreasonably dangerous and that Trent Whiteford's inju-
128ries were foreseeable. However, the district court concluded that
the snowmobile did not create an unreasonable risk of harm and
granted the summary judgment motion while dismissing the com-
plaint.'2 The court of appeals, concluding that the Whitefords'
expert created a general issue of material fact with respect to fore-
seeability, reversed in part and remanded the negligence and strict
liability claims for trial.3 Yamaha appealed to the Minnesota Su-
preme Court, arguing that they did not have a duty to protect
Trent Whiteford because the accident was not reasonably foresee-
able."' In addition, Yamaha argued that the human factors ex-
pert's affidavit did not create a genuine issue of material fact con-
cerning the issue of foreseeability.132
The issue before the Minnesota Supreme Court was whether
Trent Whiteford's accident was foreseeable enough to impose a
duty on Yamaha to protect Whiteford against injury. 1 3 The court
relied on analogous decisions from other jurisdictions that involved
individuals who were injured by contact with stationary automo-
biles.'TM
The court reasoned that Yamaha has a duty to protect the
snowmobile's user, and those who might be injured by the snow-
mobile's use or misuse, from foreseeable danger.35 Trent White-
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 918.
134. See id. at 918-19. The court, in its analysis, used the reasoning applied by
the courts in several cases. See Schneider v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 401 F.2d 549,
558 (8th Cir. 1968) (holding that it was not foreseeable to the manufacturer that
plaintiff's injury would occur given its obscure nature); Kahn v. Chrysler Corp.,
221 F. Supp. 677, 679 (S.D. Tex. 1963) (holding that a manufacturer had no duty
to design an automobile so that it would be safe for a child to ride into when
parked); Hatch v. Ford Motor Co., 329 P.2d 605, 607 (Cal. 1958) (holding that a
manufacturer could not be held negligent for designing an automobile with a ra-
diator ornament where the plaintiff ran into it).
135. See Whiteford, 582 N.W.2d at 919. The court used the reasoning in Hatch,
in which the plaintiff, age six, punctured and lost an eye when he ran into the
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ford was not using or misusing the snowmobile.3 6 The snowmobile
was stationary and not in use when Trent Whiteford slid his tobog-
gan into it. 37 The Minnesota Supreme Court found that "the dan-
ger here was too remote to impose a duty on Yamaha and was not
one which Yamaha was required to anticipate or protect against."1
8
Thus, the court agreed with the district court and held that Yamaha
could not reasonably have foreseen the accident that caused Trent
Whiteford injuries.
The court further noted that the human factors expert's affi-
davit, which asserted that a design defect existed and that Trent
Whiteford's injuries were foreseeable, did not create any genuine
issue of material fact because it did not "change the fact that the
Snoscoot was stationary and was not being operated at the time of
the accident."' 40 In addition, the court concluded that the safe toy
statute14 1 did not create a cause of action in this case because the
Snoscoot was stationary and not being operated at the time of the
accident.
42
The dissent by Justice Gilbert asserted that the majority's deci-
sion ignored the statutory definition of a mechanical hazard pro-
vided in Minnesota Statutes section 325F.08, the safe toy statute.
The dissent also criticized the majority's reliance on cases from
other jurisdictions because Whiteford's accident was not similar to
those cases. 44 Justice Gilbert asserted that a fact question had been
sharp radiator ornament of a parked automobile manufactured by the defendant.
See Hatch, 329 P.2d at 606. The Hatch court found that the automobile could cause
no harm "except to one whose own acts or the acts of some third person caused
him to collide with it." Id. at 607. The Hatch court held that the defendant was
not required to anticipate or protect against the plaintiff's accident. See id.
136. See Whiteford, 582 N.W.2d at 919. Here, the court relies on the reasoning
in Kahn, which held that the automobile manufacturer has no duty to design the
automobile that will be safe for a person to ride a bicycle into while it is parked.
See Kahn, 221 F. Supp. at 679.
137. See Whiteford, 582 N.W.2d at 919.
138. Id. Accordingly, the court found that the district court was correct in
dismissing the Whitefords' claims. See id.; see also Schneider, 401 F.2d at 557 (hold-
ing that a "manufacturer is not an insurer and cannot be held to a standard of
duty of guarding against all possible types of accidents and injuries").
139. See Whiteford, 582 N.W.2d at 919.
140. Id. at 919 n.22.
141. See MINN. STAT. §§ 325F.08-09 (1998).
142. See id. at 919 n.23.
143. See id. at 919 (citing MINN. STAT. §§ 325F.08-09) (GilbertJ, dissenting).
144. See id. Justice Gilbert noted that this case was not similar to Hatch, Kahn,
or Schneider because it involved a snowmobile, not a parked car, and the snowmo-
bile was not parked and left unattended. See id.
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created by the Whitefords' expert, who testified that the snowmo-
bile had been negligently designed, thus creating an unreasonable
risk of personal injury. Justice Gilbert further stated that it was
"quite foreseeable that the other winter recreational activities such
as tobogganing may have been taking place near the snowmo-
bile."'46
E. Vicarious Official When Official Not Named in Suit
In Wiederholt v. City of Minneapolis,147 the Minnesota Supreme
Court "explicitly" held that a governmental employer may invoke
the doctrine of official immunity whether or not the individual of-
ficial whose discretion is at issue was named as a defendant in the
S148
suit.
On June 16, 1993, a Minneapolis city sidewalk inspector, dur-
ing a routine inspection, marked a projecting sidewalk for repair
one month prior to Wiederholt's accident. 49 The inspector could
have flagged the sidewalk for immediate repair; however, immedi-
ate repairs were usually only ordered once or twice a year.150 The
inspector placed no warning device at the defective sidewalk.
5
1
On July 12, 1993, the sidewalk inspector issued the owner of
the adjoining property written notice of the projecting sidewalk
pursuant to city policy. In the notice, the adjoining property
owner was given the option to either repair the sidewalk within two
153weeks or have the city repair the sidewalk at the owner's Cost.
On July 18, 1993, before the repair period ended, Ronald
Wiederholt tripped on the projecting sidewalk slab in south Min-
154neapolis while he was in-line skating. Wiederholt's skate hit a
raised portion of the sidewalk that was 1 1/2 to 2 inches higher
than the adjacent slab.5 5 The property owner did not repair the
145. See id. at 920. Justice Gilbert lists other factual disputes that should have
gone to the jury. See id.
146. Id.
147. 581 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 1998).
148. See id. at 316-17.
149. See id. at 315.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 316; see also MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES, ch. 8, §
12 (1997).
154. See Wiederholt, 581 N.W.2d at 314.
155. See id. According to the city sidewalk division's written policy, all side-
walks projecting more than one inch above the adjacent slab are considered a
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sidewalk, and the city ultimately made the repairs in October
1993.156 According to the Minneapolis Code, the city of Minneapo-
lis has a duty "to construct, reconstruct and maintain in good re-
pair" the city's sidewalks. 57 The code further requires the "imme-
diate repair" of any broken sidewalk.
158
Wiederholt brought an action against the city of Minneapolis
alleging that the city was negligent for failing to repair the sidewalk
immediately upon notice or to provide warning of the broken
sidewalk. 59 At trial, the city of Minneapolis moved for summary
judgment claiming that it was entitled to vicarious official immunity
because the sidewalk inspector was entitled to official immunity.
The district court granted the motion. 61 The court of appeals re-
versed the summary judgment motion because the sidewalk inspec-
tor was not named as a defendant in Wiederholt's lawsuit; there-
fore, the city was not entitled to vicarious official immunity because
162the inspector did not need the protection of official immunity.
On review, the Minnesota Supreme Court first considered
whether the sidewalk inspector was entitled to official immunity.
6
1
The common law official immunity doctrine provides that a public
official who has legal duties that employ the use of personal judg-
ment or discretion is not personally liable to an individual for dam-
ages unless the official acts intentionally or maliciously.' 64 Thus, of-
ficial immunity protects public officials from liability for their
hazard and must be repaired. See id.
156. See id. at 315.
157. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 8, § 12 (1997).
158. Id. § 13. In Minneapolis, the sidewalk division of the department of pub-
lic works performs all sidewalk inspection and repair. See Wiederholt, 581 N.W.2d at
314. Three inspectors are in charge of inspecting approximately 2000 miles of
sidewalks. See id. Three contractors work all summer to repair sidewalk defects.
See id.
159. See Wiederholt, 581 N.W.2d at 314. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the city. See id. On appeal, the parties stipulated to a dis-
missal of the cause of action against the property owner. See id.
160. See id. at 314.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn. 1988) (holding
that public officials charged with duties which require the exercise of judgment
are immune from personal liability unless they committed a willful or malicious
offense); Sulsa v. State, 247 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Minn. 1976) (finding that "a public
official charged by law with duties which call for the exercise of judgment or dis-
cretion is not personally liable to an individual for damages unless he is guilty of a
willful or malicious wrong").
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discretionary actions or decisions conducted in performance of
their official duties.'r" Official immunity relieves public officials
from "the fear of personal liability" that might impair their official
duties or independent actions.
166
In an official immunity case, only discretionary actions are
immune from liability; therefore, the court first determined
whether the individual official's actions were discretionary or min-
isterial.'67 In deciding this issue, the court concluded that "[o] nce
the sidewalk inspector identified the broken slab, his duty to have
the sidewalk immediately repaired was clearly ministerial in nature
because it was 'simple and definite,""' dictated by the city's own
written policy."' 69 In addition, the court found that the inspector's
action involved no discretion and was "'absolute, certain, and im-
perative, involving merely an execution of a specific duty.""'7
Therefore, the court held that the sidewalk inspector was not enti-
tled to official immunity for his delay in ordering the repair of the
sidewalk.'
The court further held that the city of Minneapolis was not en-
titled to vicarious official immunity"' because the sidewalk inspec-
tor did not have official immunity for his ministerial duty.'73 In do-
ing so, the court clarified its prior stance made in Watson ex rel.
Hanson v. Metropolitan Transit Commission14 by explicitly holding
that a governmental employer may invoke the doctrine of official
immunity whether or not the individual official whose discretion is
at issue was named as a defendant in the suit. 7 5 Otherwise, the
court noted, if the governmental employer was not entitled to vi-
165. SeeJanklow v. Minnesota Bd. of Examiners for Nursing Home Adm'rs.,
552 N.W.2d 711, 716 (Minn. 1996).
166. See Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 678.
167. See Wiederholt, 581 N.W.2d at 315.
168. Williamson v. Cain, 245 N.W.2d 242, 244 (Minn. 1976) (defining a minis-
terial duty as "simple and definite").
169. Wiederholt, 581 N.W.2d at 316.
170. Id. (quoting Cook v. Trovattan, 200 Minn. 221, 224, 274 N.W. 165, 167
(1937)).
171. See Wiederholt, 581 N.W.2d at 316.
172. Vicarious official immunity protects the government employer from liabil-
ity based on the official immunity of its employee. See Wiederholt, 581 N.W.2d at
316. Generally, if the employee has official immunity, the suit against government
employer is dismissed without explanation. See Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38,
42 (Minn. 1992).
173. See Wiederholt, 581 N.W.2d at 316.
174. 553 N.W.2d 406, 415-16 (Minn. 1996).
175. See Wiederholt, 581 N.W.2d at 316-17.
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carious official immunity just because the official was not named a
defendant in the suit, the plaintiff could always defeat the immu-
nity by not naming the official as a defendant.
Edmund Emerson III
176. See id. at 317.
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